Flaws Cited in Foreclosure Review By Alan Zibel - Wall Street Journal - April 3, 2013, at: http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB100014241278873239163045784008829358200...
It would be interesting to know how many of the 'wrongfully' foreclosed borrower 'victims' were in judicial foreclosure states and how many such 'victims' were in states in which the mortgage / trust deed had a power-of-sale clause. And, in each case, it would be interesting to know what number of borrowers were actually in serious default when the foreclosure notice was served, and how many borrowers not in default were served with a notice of foreclosure.
It seems one of the issues which has seriously complicated the foreclosure process arose out of the mis-management of note holder, mortgagee and land title records in the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). The Mortgage Electronic Registration System was conceived by Fannie Mae, and the development of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System was overseen and financed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
MERS is apparently seriously flawed. The system has few controls, a peculiar (or non-existent) managerial hierarchy, and MERS doesn't seem to be properly audited (or auditable).
"Reston Based Company in the Middle of Foreclosure Chaos" by Brady Dennis & Ariana Cha - Washington Post 10/8/2010, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/07/AR2010100702742.html
"Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration System's Land Title Theory" By Christopher L. Peterson - SSRN, at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684729
Obama Faces Pressure From Left on Housing Regulator
Wall Street Journal - Developments February 7, 2013
By Alan Zibel
Rep. Elijah Cummings (D., Md.) is among lawmakers calling on
President Obama to nominate a permanent director for the FHFA.
When will the White House finally have something to say about President Barack Obama’s pick to run the FHFA?
That question is on the mind of 45 House Democrats. The lawmakers, led by Reps. Elijah Cummings (D., Md.) and John Tierney (D., Mass.), sent a letter on Thursday to President Barack Obama urging him to nominate a director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency–-the federal regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
“We believe your re-election is a prime opportunity to put forth a new candidate who is ready and willing to implement all of Congress’ directives to meet the critical challenges still facing our nation’s housing-finance markets,” the lawmakers wrote.
The agency’s acting director, Edward DeMarco, has been criticized by Democrats on Capitol Hill, administration officials and liberal groups, all of whom have been calling on Mr. Obama to replace Mr. DeMarco.
Representatives for the White House and Mr. DeMarco were not immediately available for comment.
Why all the fuss about a seemingly obscure regulator? The most prominent area of conflict has been the FHFA’s refusal to accept the Obama administration’s offer to subsidize the cost of debt forgiveness for troubled homeowners.
Obama administration officials argued that Fannie and Freddie could actually save money by doing so but Mr. DeMarco said no, arguing that any potential savings would not be large enough to overcome other costs.
As Developments reported in December, the White House has been exploring potential leaders for the agency.
But the matter does not appear to be especially urgent for the administration as it focuses on confirming leaders for cabinet-level agencies such as the Treasury Department.
Another issue is that it may be difficult to find a FHFA nominee who could clear the Senate, where Republicans are likely to be skeptical of any choice: The administration’s first choice to run the FHFA, former North Carolina banking regulator Joseph Smith, withdrew his name more than two years ago in the face of intense Republican opposition.
Many on the left would like Mr. Obama to use a recess appointment to install Mr. DeMarco’s replacement. But that outcome is now highly unlikely, now after a federal court ruled that Mr. Obama’s use of that method to install three members of a federal labor panel was unconstitutional.
An historical observation relating to this pressure from the left on federal housing policy:
On Thursday (1/17/2013) The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank released the transcripts of its 2007 meetings. [Late 2007 was when the the great housing and mortgage bubble began to suddenly deflate.]If you depend upon the most knowledgeable economic and financial experts to anticipate the economy’s behavior, and / or to give you advice on how you should behave, so as to grow and protect your assets, the two articles below may cause you to doubt the ability of such experts, and to confirm the existence of Black Swans.(1)
Days Before the Housing Bust, Fed Doubted Need to Act By Binyamin Applebaum – pub. New York Times - 1/18/2013, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/business/economy/fed-transcripts-open-a-window-on-2007-crisis.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130119
Records Show Fed Wavering in 2007 By Jon Hilsenrath and Christina Peterson – pub. Wall Street Journal - 1/18/ 2013, at: http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424127887323968304578249664285846402-lMyQjAxMTAzMDEwOTExNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_valettop_email
Timothy Geithner's flat-footed reaction is even more amazing when you realize that Geithner worked in the Japanese Embassy, as a Treasury Department attaché, at the beginning of Japan's "Lost Decade".Japan's "Lost Decade' was a financial crisis which began with the collapse of the Japanese commercial real estate bubble. The collapse of the Japanese commercial real estate bubble created problems for the Japanese economy which are very similar to the problems U.S. and global economies have been experiencing since 2008.(2)From a January 18, 2013 New York Times article, "Days Before The Bust, Fed Doubted Need to Act" By Benyamin Applebaum (at the time of the Federal Reserve's transcript's creation William Poole, was the Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).“The outcome would have been different only if the Fed and others had reacted back in 2004, 2005, 2006” to curtail subprime mortgage lending, Mr. Poole, now a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute, said on Friday in an interview on CNBC.(3)Footnotes:(1) For more on Black Swans see Wikipedia entry, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_swan_theory(2) For more on Japan’s Lost Decade see Wikipedia entry, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lost_Decade_(Japan)(3) For the full CNBC interview with Mr. Poole go to YouTube and watch, An Interview with former President of the St. Lewis Federal Reserve, William Poole:More:"The Role of the Government Sponsored Enterprises and Federal Housing Policy in the Financial Crisis”, at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/106248756/The-Role-of-the-Government-Sponsored-Enterprises-and-Federal-Housing-Policy-in-the-Financial-CrisisOn YouTube key-words-search, and watch, a January 1998 PBS NewsHour interview with then President Bill Clinton, titled "Bill Clinton: Laying the Foundation for The House of Cards"
November 1, 2011 Michael Bloomberg - The Good Democrat
Speaking at a business breakfast in midtown featuring Bloomberg and two former New York City mayors, Bloomberg was asked what he thought of the Occupy Wall Street protesters."I hear your complaints," Bloomberg said. "Some of them are totally unfounded. It was not the banks that created the mortgage crisis. It was, plain and simple, Congress who forced everybody to go and give mortgages to people who were on the cusp. Now, I'm not saying I'm sure that was terrible policy, because a lot of those people who got homes still have them and they wouldn't have gotten them without that."But they were the ones who pushed Fannie and Freddie to make a bunch of loans that were imprudent, if you will. They were the ones that pushed the banks to loan to everybody. And now we want to go vilify the banks because it's one target, it's easy to blame them and congress certainly isn't going to blame themselves. At the same time, Congress is trying to pressure banks to loosen their lending standards to make more loans. This is exactly the same speech they criticized them for."Bloomberg went on to say it's "cathartic" and "entertaining" to blame people, but the important thing now is to fix the problem.--------------------------------------------------A Few Questions: Was it only 'Congress' that created and allowed pressures motivating banks to abandon due diligence banking? Or, did pressure from, and policies supported by, the executive branch play an even greater role, than Congress’s role, in the creation of the housing and mortgage bubble - which led to the financial crisis? Who in Congress supported the policies that created the problem? Which players in the executive branch and its bureaucracy enforced and expanded the Community Reinvestment Act and the Affordable Housing Act?
If you are interested in knowing more about what policies might have contributed to the great financial crises, which began in mid-2006, you will be interested in watching the accompanying two videos.
This video is an excerpt from a longer YouTube video in which Godfrey Bloom discusses some of the problems which led to the financial crisis. This excerpt deals primarily with the Community Reinvestment Act and its role in weakening bank lending standards and credit 'due diligence'. If you are interested in watching the complete discussion key words search for "Godfrey Bloom The Big Sub-Prime Gamble" on YouTube.
Also, in the context of the Community Reinvestment Act's role in the financial crisis, you might want to watch, "Bill Clinton: Laying the Foundation for The House of Cards" - which is a video-clip from PBS NewsHour interview conducted shortly after Clinton was elected to his second presidential term (So, at the time of this interview Clinton had four more years to push The Community Reinvestment Act).
Other Resources:
(1) A Bibliography The Role of the Government Sponsored Enterprises and Federal Housing Policy in The Financial Crisis, at:
(2) Peter Wallison, Why I dissented from the Majority Report of The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, at:
November 5, 2012
Congressman Brad Sherman5000 Van Nuys Blvd. - Suite 420
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Dear Congressman Sherman:
I live in the 27th Congressional District. I know you sit on the House Financial Services Committee and its Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, and I know that you also sit on the Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing and Community Opportunity.
Therefore, it seems appropriate that I bring a concern of mine to your attention.
My concern: While reading an article published in the Wall Street Journal on October 2, 2012 titled, New York Firm to Buy Fannie Foreclosures By Alan Zibel, I noticed the author mentioned the terms were the same for both of Fannie Mae’s first two ‘bulk sales’ (of foreclosed single family homes). An outline of the terms of the deals was provided in the article (the last four paragraphs of the article).
It seems the terms of these first two bulk sales may lead to an uncertain, and very long payback period to for the GSE’s - and an even riskier and even longer payback period for any investor(s) that might be the source of funds for the managers of these deals. As long as the deal terms are fully-disclosed to the fund's (voluntary) investors their investments are their business.
However, because of the history of Federal Housing Policy, and because of the history of the GSE’s, I believe deals such as these should be designed in a way which can actually be expected to produce rapid and less risky payment of the purchase price, than it appears the terms of the first two deals will produce.
I hope the committees you sit on will very closely review and monitor these two existing deals, and that you will have independent evaluators advise on, and audit, the structure and payment of future bulk sales of foreclosed single family homes.
The bulk sale of foreclosed single family homes is a serious concern for homeowners, neighborhoods, and for local legislators. I believe the future financial success of these bulk sales is a critical element of the bulk sales strategy.
In the context of the GSA’s, it appears the terms of these first two deals were designed to move foreclosed homes off the GSE’s balance sheet, and to claim the 'sales agreement' as an asset.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to express my concern.Sincerely,
Bill George
Cc. Congressman Gary Miller
2349 Rayburn House Office BuildingWashington, DC 20515
Background Information:
(1) Private Equity’s Foreclosure Binge (& Purge) By Michael L Boyer pub. at Seeking Alpha, October 23, 2012 - at: http://seekingalpha.com/article/941291-private-equity-s-foreclosure-binge-purge#comments_header
(2) The Institutional Home Buying Bubble By Bill George - Posterous - at:
http://billsplace.posterous.com/the-institutional-home-buying-bubble
The change to mark-to-market accounting for certain classes of financial assets (GAAP) has been delayed by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) - with pressure from the U.S. Congress and bank lobbyists (see: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124396078596677535.html). So, the necessity to actually account for these bank assets' true market value is currently suspended.
If a mortgage owner is a bank and the bank forecloses, the process for re-pricing the asset begins. And, the amount of the loss on the asset would then reduce the calculated bank reserves and force the regulators to require the bank to add more reserves. Under present market conditions this would not be a good thing for the bank, or for the U.S. Government. (Under present conditions banks which could not raise more reserve assets would be forced into FDIC receivership). And, if banks actually began to foreclose rapidly on all borrowers-in-default the calls for Government Sponsored Agency (GSA) loan insurance payoffs would further complicate the bail-out of the GSA's. Also, the demand for private mortgage insurance payoffs would put further stress on private mortgage insurers and impose additional stress on the financial system in general (and probably require private insurers to increase their required reserves).
Another reason banks might avoid foreclosing on a borrower-in-default is that judges are becoming a bit cantankerous. Judges have begun to force loan modifications, mandate cram-downs, and in the absence of good physical documentation proving a bank or investor actually owns the loan, some judges have even awarded property to the (supposed) borrower when the loan documentation is missing, flawed or incomplete.
It seems that the rush to originate loans, slice-and-dice loan tranches, construct CMO derivatives, track ownership, and re-register frequently traded CMO's (in the electronic registration system) led some necessary loan details, and even some complete documentation, to "go missing". So banks and investors are beginning to see foreclosure as a risky and potentially expensive option. (see: 10/24/09 NYT article by Gretchen Morgensen titled, "If Lenders Say 'The Dog Ate Your Mortgage' " at> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/business/economy/25gret.html )
Another subtlety, as long as the bank allows the borrower-in-default to stay in the home the mortgage investor (bank or CMO investor) is not as greatly exposed to losses from theft, vandalism and gross depreciation of real estate value due to non-maintenance of the property.
Also, by not foreclosing on borrowers-in-default the lender avoids becoming the owner of the property and thus avoids direct liability for property taxes, HOA Fees, and some of the more recently imposed municipality assessments levied against investors who now own foreclosed property (see: http://www.dlapiper.com/miami-dade_foreclosure_ordinances/ for another example see mosquito abatement fees in some areas of California - Indio, Palm Springs, Stockton, Mountain House, etc.)
If the "shadow inventory" came to the market all at once demand would be even further overwhelmed by supply causing even more significant price erosion.
It’s logical . . . perhaps corrupt, but logical.
Other Resources:
1. See CoreLogic.com at: http://www.corelogic.com/search.aspx?q=shadow+inventory
2. The Case-Shiller S&P Home Price Index is published on the last Tuesday of the month with a two month time lag in reporting for data gathering and data analysis, at: http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en...
3. Also see, YouTube video The Impact of The Delay in Implementing FAS#157 at:
4. And, watch the YouTube video The Short Sale Conundrum - Mortgage Servicers’ Misaligned Incentives at:
5. Re: Was the strategy for delaying the pain learned during Japan's 'Lost Decade'? “Geithner worked for Kissinger Associates in Washington for three years and then joined the International Affairs division of the U.S. Treasury Department in 1988. He went on to serve as an attaché at the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo.” From Wikipedia, Timothy Geithner at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_Geithner
6. Watch a brief segment of Georgetown Law Professor Adam Levitin's Congressional testimony titled, "Regulators Don't Want to Know" at:
Burdened by Old Mortgages, Banks Are Slow to Lend Now By Nick Timiraos Wall Street Journal, pub. October 3, 2012
From the article:
Part of the problem lies in changes in mortgage processing over the past few decades. Fannie and Freddie rolled out automated-underwriting systems in the mid-1990s that allowed lenders to punch borrower data into computer systems in order to receive faster approvals or denials.The mortgage bust highlighted weaknesses. Fannie and Freddie did few upfront reviews of loans that they purchased; instead, they screened some of those that went bad, forcing banks to buy back any with obvious signs of negligence or fraud.After the meltdown, the mortgage giants began hiring armies of auditors—called "bounty hunters" by bank executives—to conduct detailed reviews of loan files to spot errors that could justify a put-back.deja vu
In addition to the problems mentioned in Institutional Home Buying Bubble (see post below) there are few other reasonable concerns about the programs that facilitate such institutional bulk purchases.
In addition to the operational difficulties, the operational overhead, and the lack of ‘scalability’ in the bulk ownership and the property management of single family homes – which are presumably geographically disbursed - some commenters have mentioned a few other un-intended negative consequences which might flow from federal government sponsored, and large bank sponsored, programs for the bulk sale of Real Estate Owned (REO) and foreclosed single family properties. To read about some of the other (somewhat predictable) unintended negative consequences of the bulk sales of single family homes to institutional owners read the articles named and hyperlinked below.
Resources:
Our Coming Rentcropper Society By Yves Smith posted on NakedCapitalism 8/21/2012, at: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/08/our-coming-rentcropper-society.html#Td4eh6HzCh0JProP.99
Our Coming Rentcropper Society: Private Equity Firms Buying-up Blocks of Foreclosures Nationwide By HiPointDem posted on DemocraticUnderground 8/24/2012, at: http://www.democraticunderground.com/10021191182
Foreclosure Bulk Sales Program Allows Banks and Hedgefunds to Buy Low After Selling High By David Dayen posted on FDL March 21, 2012, at: http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/03/21/foreclosure-bulk-sales-program-allows-banks-and-hedge-funds-to-buy-low-after-selling-high/
FHA Moving Forward with Bulk REO Sales By Greg Fielding from 8/27/2012 post on Bay Area Real Estate Trends, at: http://bayarearealestatetrends.com/2012/08/27/fhfa-moving-forward-with-bulk-reo-sales/
In November of 2011, at a business roundtable in Mid-town Manhattan a member of the press asked NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg for his thoughts on the Occupy Wall Street Movement (OWS).
He said, “They are blaming the wrong people. Plain and simple, Congress caused the mortgage crisis, not Wall Street”.
Watch as Mayor Bloomberg makes his, Blame Congress Declaration