Who's Sorry Now . . .

Burdened by Old Mortgages, Banks Are Slow to Lend Now By Nick Timiraos Wall Street Journal, pub. October 3, 2012

From the article:
Part of the problem lies in changes in mortgage processing over the past few decades. Fannie and Freddie rolled out automated-underwriting systems in the mid-1990s that allowed lenders to punch borrower data into computer systems in order to receive faster approvals or denials.

The mortgage bust highlighted weaknesses. Fannie and Freddie did few upfront reviews of loans that they purchased; instead, they screened some of those that went bad, forcing banks to buy back any with obvious signs of negligence or fraud.

After the meltdown, the mortgage giants began hiring armies of auditors—called "bounty hunters" by bank executives—to conduct detailed reviews of loan files to spot errors that could justify a put-back.

deja vu

Recovery, Twisting in the Wind

I find that, when discussing The Shadow Inventory, almost all real estate specialists, lawyers, regulators and many financial analysts can’t tie one very significant cause into the conversation.

The very significant cause that is missed is a rational explanation of why banks and other mortgage investors are so reluctant to liquidate (or renegotiate) bad investments.

Why do they hold significant amounts of mortgage investments which have little hope of being profitable (over the long term)? When a mortgage is in serious default, why don’t mortgage investors accept a ‘short sale’ - and why do they allow a property to go into the potentially higher loss alternative of foreclosure?

I believe the key to understanding why mortgage investors appear to be behaving irrationally, is to understand the implications of the delay in the implementation of Financial Accounting Standard #157 (mark-to-market accounting).(1)

To understand the implications of the delay in the implementation of FAS #157 read an article from the Wall Street Journal titled, Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule By Susan Pulliam & Tom McGinty | pub. 6/3/2009.(2)

 Then watch Georgetown University Law Professor, Adam Levitin’s Congressional testimony titled, Federal Regulators Don’t Want to Know . . . (3)

The point that I believe most commenters miss:

The postponement of the implementation of mark-to-market accounting (FAS 157) gives banks and other mortgage (product) investors the opportunity to delay recognition of their market losses until legal ownership of the property changes (foreclosure). Thus, for the investor, the hoped for offset of losses against future revenue is 'the gating factor’ for the liquidation of the shadow inventory.

Most mortgage investors are institutions. These institutions want to delay the recognition of, and the reporting reporting of, any losses to their investors - and to their regulators - for as long as possible.

As Professor Levitin explains in his Congressional testimony, these institutional investors hope to offset losses against income (fees and penalty revenue) over the next decade.

So, the shadow inventory seems to be a consequence of the rational ‘work-out’ in a world in which institutions can carry (and report) highly depreciated assets at (fantasy) origination value.

P.S. I believe in creative destruction.(4)

Footnotes:
1. See Wikipedia Mark-to-Market accounting scroll to, Effect on subprime crisis and Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark-to-market_accounting
2. Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule By Susan Pulliam & Tom McGinty | pub. 6/3/2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124396078596677535.html
3. Georgetown University Law Professor, Adam Levitin’s Congressional testimony titled, Federal Regulators Don’t Want to Know . . . at: http://youtu.be/ibgdgl0PoBw
4. Creative Destruction (Shumpeter) see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_destruction

End Note: Even some fairly sophisticated observers can’t put the delay in the implementation of FAS 157 into its proper perspective. Why do mortgage investors prefer foreclosure over a short sale? Watch Congressman Bobby Scott (D-VA) question a panel of mortgage professionals asking, ‘Are there things in accounting principals that we need to change to get everybody to do what’s in everybody's best interests?’at:

 Then listen to Thomas Cox, of Main Attorney’s Saving Homes Project, answer Rep. Scott. Mr. Cox emphasizes a different point (the conflict of interest created by servicer fee revenue) in The Short Sale Conundrum - Misaligned Incentives of Mortgage Servicers, at: and when James Kowalski, a Florida Trial Attorney for Saving Home Project, gets his turn he moves to The MERS Mess. Mr. Kawolski explains the increase in the shadow inventory as a documentation problem rather than an accounting problem, at:

The Recipe for Economic Crisis

The other day I was reading an article which mentioned an organization called FM Watch.1 Out of curiosity, I did a key-words-search on: FM Watch. I discovered FM Watch was founded by private mortgage industry interests in the late 1990’s. Apparently, FM Watch was created with defined purpose of focusing attention on anti-competitive and risky mortgage lending practices employed by the Government Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.2 And, it seems FM Watch even anticipated that, if unchecked, the behavior of these Government Sponsored Enterprises would evolve even further into more risky and stronger anti-competitive behavior.3

While I was reading about FM Watch I saw a reference and a hyperlink to a video presentation called “A Crisis of Credit Visualized” it was claimed to be a very good video presentation describing the circumstances involved in the real estate bubble and the mortgage crises. Out of curiosity I went to the link and watched the video presentation. I thought you might also find the presentation interesting.4  

I thought “A Crisis of Credit Visualized” was a good presentation of the basic processes in mortgage lending, mortgage securitization and mortgage financing. However, with the exception of the comment about the role of Greenspan era U.S. Federal Reserve interest rate policy, it lacks any discussion about the role of federal housing policy and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) in the creation and the extension of the housing bubble.

Furthermore, the presentation fails to specifically explain how government subsidized cheap money financing and government subsidized mortgage insurance increased demand and pushed home prices to levels that exceeded borrowers’ ability to repay what they borrowed (to finance their home purchases).

And, the presentation fails to emphasize that, after the bubble peaked, as riskier borrowers defaulted on their mortgages and those homes went on the market, the excess supply of houses and downward cascading home prices caused home values to drop to the point that well qualified borrowers, who could afford their mortgages, began to question the economic wisdom of continuing to pay down their mortgage. These qualified buyers’ decisions not to continue to pay their mortgage contributed further to the excess supply of homes which contributed to the further deterioration of home prices.5

In the viewer comments on “A Crisis of Credit Visualized” I found a comment mentioning the lack of information about how federal housing policy and the behavior of the Government Sponsored Enterprises contributed to the crises of credit. The commenter provided a link to another video titled, Burning Down the House: What Caused Our Economic Crisis?6 I believe that, by watching both “A Crisis of Credit Visualized” and “Burning Down The House: What Caused Our Economic Crisis” one can gain a very clear understanding of the major forces which caused the U.S. economic crisis.

1. Freddie’s Friend Newt By Holman w. Jenkins Jr. Wall Street Journal Opinion/Editorial page November 19, 2011.

2. Is FM Watch a Crusader With an Agenda? By Louis Sichelman – RealtyTimes, pub. 7/5/1999

3. New Alliance Confronts FM Watch, Champions Existing Housing Finance System By Broderick Perkins RealtyTimes, pub.10/5/2000

4. The Crisis of Credit Visualized A video presentation by Jonathon Jarvis published on Vimeo - 3 years ago

5. Many mortgage borrowers think of the home as an investment they will use in later years to fund children’s education, or their own retirement. If these home borrowers begin to believe the investment will end-up being a loss, or can’t be refinanced, their attitude toward continuing to make their mortgage payment changes - significantly. See, Underwater Home: What You Should Do if You Owe More Than Your Home Is Worth? By Professor Brent T. White - pub. 10/15/2010 and/or key-words-search “Strategic Default”.

6. Burning Down The House: What Caused Our Economic Crisis YouTube by TheMouthPeace pub. Sept. 30, 2008